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I. INTRODUCTION
After a slew of highly publicized corporate accounting scandals
during the early 2000s at prominent companies-including Enron,
WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco-public confidence in the integrity of
financial reporting by public companies was undoubtedly shaken.1
Several major financial reporting frauds demonstrated serious
weaknesses with the then self-regulated accounting profession,
including the failure of auditors to detect those companies that were
"cooking their books."2 The collapse of several prominent companies
not only affected top executives, who often were subjected to civil and
criminal charges, but also produced harsh consequences for several
other constituencies who relied on the integrity of the accounting
firms to detect these discrepancies in financial reporting. 3 As one
scholar phrased it: "The growing number of accounting and corporate
governance scandals had sounded an alarm, which was made all the
1. See Penelope Patsuris, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM, Aug. 26, 2002, http://
www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html (providing a summary of corporate
accounting scandals between 2000-2002, including several billion dollar overstatements).
2. Elliott J. Weiss, Some Thoughts on an Agenda for the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 53 DUKE L.J. 491, 492-93 (2003).
3. See Enron, Executives Sued Over Pension Losses, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 27, 2003,
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/06/27/news-pf/Business/Enron__exectivessued.shtml (reporting
on the Labor Department's lawsuit against Enron and its former executives and directors for
mismanagement of employee retirement plans).
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more deafening by the staggering sums of money lost by shareholders,
employees, and retirees of the companies involved."4
Reacting swiftly to the public concern, Congress passed
landmark legislation in 2002. Congress designed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act ("SOX") to regulate the conduct of public accounting firms and to
revive investors' confidence in the integrity of public companies'
financial reporting and disclosures.5 After signing SOX into law,
President George W. Bush declared that SOX included some of "the
most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."6
SOX represented a radical departure from the previously self-
regulated accounting profession. As a central part of SOX, Congress
created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB")
and provided it with extensive authority to ensure that SOX's lofty
objectives were met.7 Among the PCAOB's significant powers and
responsibilities is the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
governing the standards and issuance of audit reports, to conduct
inspections and investigations of registered public accounting firms,
and to impose monetary sanctions on registered firms for
noncompliance with its standards.8
Determined to facilitate public confidence in the integrity of
public company accounting oversight, Congress purposefully insulated
its new regulatory entity from political influence. 9 Central to the
PCAOB's independence are the limitations on the appointment and
removal of its members. SOX vests the power of appointment and
removal of PCAOB members with the commissioners of the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and limits the commissioners'
ability to remove the PCAOB members except "for good cause
shown."10 The commissioners, in turn, are removable by the President
4. Donna M. Nagy, The SEC at 70. Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The
PCAOB and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 996 (2005). Audit failures
reportedly cost investors nearly half a trillion dollars in 2001. Brief for Appellees Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd. et al. at 1, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
6. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 2002, at Al.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
8. Id. §§ 7211(c)(1)-(7).
9. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing Congress's intent to provide the PCAOB with
substantive independence from political pressure).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(4)(a), (6).
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only for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office."" Congress,
therefore, created a novel "double for-cause limitation on removal,"
where the restriction on the PCAOB's removal passes through two
levels of control. 12 The constitutionality of this structure, in which the
President's power to remove an officer of the executive branch is
restricted by two "for-cause" limitations, has never been tested in any
court prior to a recent challenge to SOX.13
The PCAOB's substantial independence from political
interference prompted the Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit public
interest group that promotes economic growth and limited
government, to challenge the constitutionality of the PCAOB. 14 The
Free Enterprise Fund sets forth two main arguments for why SOX's
provisions governing appointment and removal of the PCAOB are
unconstitutional.' 5  First, it argues that SOX violates the
Appointments Clause because the PCAOB members are "principal
officers" who must be nominated by the President, not the SEC
commissioners.' 6 It believes that the members of the PCAOB are
principal officers because of their extensive power granted through
SOX and the lack of SEC oversight of their operations. 17 Second, the
Free Enterprise Fund argues that the structure of the PCAOB violates
the principle of separation of powers because the double for-cause
limitation on removal unconstitutionally restricts the President's
power to remove federal officers.' 8 The Free Enterprise Fund believes
the two levels of for-cause removal restrictions unconstitutionally
interfere with the President's ability to carry out his constitutional
mandate to "take care that the Laws be faithfully executed."' 9
After a district court decision and a split of opinion at the D.C.
Circuit, the constitutionality of the PCAOB remains uncertain. The
11. Id. § 2053(a).
12. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 679 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (acknowledging that the challenge to this type of removal structure was a "question of first
impression"), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 670.
15. Id. at 668-70.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President the power to appoint, along with
the advice and consent of the Senate, "Officers of the United States"); Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d
at 668-69 (explaining appellant's argument that only the President should have the power to
appoint PCAOB board members, presuming their status as principle officers under the
Appointments Clause).
17. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672.
18. Id. at 679.
19. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (commonly referred to as the "Take Care Clause").
1956 [Vol. 62:6:1953
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District Court for the District of Columbia found the PCAOB's
appointment and removal structures constitutional-a victory for the
PCAOB. 20 On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the three-
judge panel recognized the challenge to the constitutionality of a
double for-cause limitation on removal as a matter of first
impression. 21 In fact, the court acknowledged that "[n]either [it] nor
the PCAOB nor the United States as intervenor has located any
historical analogues for this novel structure."22 Two of the three panel
judges of the D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court's order. 23 Judge
Kavanaugh, however, strongly dissented in favor of the PCAOB,
labeling this recent challenge as "the most important separation-of-
powers case regarding the President's appointment and removal
powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years."24 Fortunately, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this important test to two
of the President's most essential powers. The case will be heard during
the October 2009 Term.25
This Note analyzes SOX's provisions governing the
appointment and removal of the PCAOB and reconciles the differing
interpretations of the Appointments Clause and the principle of
separation of powers as they pertain to the PCAOB. Part II provides
background on SOX and case law relevant to the constitutional
challenges at issue in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board. Part III sets forth competing
interpretations of the Appointments Clause and separation of powers
jurisprudence. It explains the positions of the challengers to and
supporters of SOX, and how they apply their respective
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent to debate the
constitutionality of the PCAOB.
Part IV reconciles these differing interpretations and provides
a solution to the constitutional challenges to the PCAOB. Part IV first
20. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No.06-0217, 2007 WL 891675,
at *4-6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007). Several amici curiae were written on behalf of the Free
Enterprise Fund and the PCAOB, respectively, and the United States stepped in as intervener
for the PCAOB. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Council of Institutional Investors in Support of
Defendants-Appellees and Urging Affirmance, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127) [hereinafter Institutional Investors
Brief].
21. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 697-98.
22. Id. at 699 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 668-69 (majority opinion).
24. Id. at 685 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
25. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 129 S. Ct. 2378 (2009).
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explains that, notwithstanding any preliminary obstacles to reaching
the constitutional issues, the significant constitutional safeguards to
government accountability at stake, as well as the presence of investor
uncertainty, necessitate a resolution of the constitutional issues. It
then proposes that the PCAOB members are inferior officers, and
therefore their appointment is constitutional, because the SEC
maintains "veto power" over the PCAOB's most critical powers.
Notwithstanding this determination, Part IV argues that the Supreme
Court should nonetheless find the PCAOB's removal structure
unconstitutional. It discusses why the double for-cause removal
restriction on the PCAOB both excessively attenuates the President's
ability to see that the laws are faithfully executed and draws power to
Congress over the execution of the laws. Part IV urges the Supreme
Court not to take a step down the "slippery slope" in permitting an
unprecedented congressional encroachment on the President's
removal authority.
II. BACKGROUND: SOX AND SELECTED CASE LAW
ON THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
This Part provides background information on SOX and the
case law leading to the conflict in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Section A discusses the
authority granted to the PCAOB and the SEC's oversight of this
regulatory body, which provides the context for the respective
arguments under the Appointments Clause and the principle of
separation of powers. Section B discusses the Appointments Clause
and relevant case law on the distinction between principal and inferior
officers. Section C discusses the principle of separation of powers and
congressional limitations on the President's removal power.
A. SOX and Its Creation of the PCAOB
Prior to the enactment of SOX in 2002 and its creation of the
PCAOB, the accounting profession was largely self-regulated, with the
profession's trade associations establishing their own accounting
principles and auditing standards. 26 In the aftermath of accounting
misconduct that captured front-page headlines and resulted in major
26. See Institutional Investors Brief, supra note 20, at 3-10 (providing a history of the self-
regulatory system of the accounting profession).
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collapses at several prominent public companies, Congress reacted
with consequential legislation. 27 After several congressional committee
hearings and debates in both houses of Congress and more than thirty
proposed bills, Congress passed SOX by an overwhelming majority in
both houses.28
The purpose of SOX is to develop regulatory procedures that
bolster public confidence in the integrity of public accounting firms
and the public companies for which they issue and certify audit
reports. 29 At the center of SOX, Congress created a new regulatory
authority-the PCAOB---charged with protecting the interests of
investors and facilitating the preparation of accurate and independent
audit reports of public companies. 30
1. The Structure of the PCAOB and Its Authority
Congress created the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation to
carry out the objectives of SOX. 31 The PCAOB consists of five members
who are appointed for five-year terms by the commissioners of the
SEC. 32 The PCAOB members are removable only "for good cause
shown" by the commissioners of the SEC.33 The commissioners, in
turn, are only removable by the President for cause. 34 This structure
hence constitutes the double for-cause restriction on the removal of
the members of the PCAOB.
SOX grants the PCAOB broad regulatory authority over
accounting firms engaged in the business of auditing publicly traded
companies. 35 SOX requires public accounting firms to register with the
PCAOB, making it unlawful for any non-registered public accounting
firm to prepare or issue any audit report with respect to any public
company.36 Congress delegated to the PCAOB broad powers to adopt
27. See Nagy, supra note 4, at 977 (noting that Congress enacted the PCAOB in direct
response to the collapse of prominent public companies). Audit failures reportedly cost investors
nearly half a trillion dollars in 2001. Brief for Appellees, supra note 4, at 1.
28. See Nagy, supra note 4, at 1001, 1006 (summarizing the hearings and debates that led
to the passage of the SOX bill).
29. Weiss, supra note 2, at 492.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
31. Id.; see also Nagy, supra note 4, at 1031 (concluding that notwithstanding Congress's
designation of the PCAOB as a private nonprofit corporation, the PCAOB is a "state actor" and a
public entity in light of Supreme Court precedent).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(1), (4), (5).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(6), 7217(d)(3).
34. Id. § 78(d).
35. See id. § 7211(c) (outlining the broad authority delegated to the PCAOB).
36. Id. § 7212(a).
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and implement rules in accordance with SOX, including auditing and
attestation standards, quality control standards, ethics standards, and
auditor-independence requirements.37
SOX also grants the PCAOB the authority to conduct
inspections of registered firms and to initiate investigations of any
conduct that may violate SOX or related accounting oversight rules. 38
The PCAOB may initiate disciplinary proceedings for a registered
firm's failure to cooperate with an investigation.39 If the PCAOB finds
a violation of SOX, PCAOB-promulgated rules, or securities laws, it
"may impose such disciplinary or remedial sanctions as it determines
appropriate," including suspension or revocation of registration or a
civil monetary penalty. 40 SOX further empowers the PCAOB to assess
an "annual accounting support fee" on the nation's public companies
pursuant to its own standards. 41
2. SEC Oversight
Subject to certain restrictions, SOX provides the SEC
commissioners with some degree of oversight of the PCAOB.42 SOX
grants the commissioners the power to appoint and remove PCAOB
members, except that removal must only be for good cause shown. 43
SOX further narrows the definition of "good cause shown" to instances
where a Board member has (1) willfully violated SOX or related rules,
(2) willfully abused his or her authority, or (3) unjustifiably failed to
enforce compliance of the public company accounting rules.44
SOX mandates that no proposed rule of the PCAOB shall
become effective without prior approval of the SEC, following its
notice-and-comment procedures. 45 The SEC may abrogate, delete
from, or add to PCAOB-promulgated rules, 46 and it may relieve the
37. Id. § 7213(a)(1).
38. Id. §§ 7214(a), 7215(b)(1).
39. Id. § 7215(c)(1).
40. Id. §§ 7215(c)(4)(A), (D).
41. Id. § 7219(d). The Free Enterprise Fund indicates in its brief that the PCAOB has
collected this tax from approximately 10,000 companies. Brief of Appellants at 6, Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5127).
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (2006) (outlining the SEC commissioners' oversight
responsibility).
43. Id. §§ 7211(e)(4), (6).
44. Id. § 7217(d)(3).
45. Id. §§ 7217(b)(2), (4) (incorporating 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)).
46. Id. § 7217(b)(5).
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PCAOB of its enforcement authority. 47 The PCAOB must conduct
inspections under rules approved by the SEC and submit inspection
reports for SEC review upon request.48 The SEC may also modify
PCAOB-imposed sanctions if it finds them inappropriate."
49
3. The PCAOB's Political Independence
After considering several alternative proposals for
strengthening the supervision of the accounting profession in response
to the corporate scandals in the early 2000s, Congress ultimately
created the PCAOB and intentionally insulated this new regulatory
entity from political pressure. A central purpose of SOX is the creation
of an accounting oversight board that is substantially independent
from the President, the SEC, and other political influences.50 Senator
Sarbanes, one of the most influential legislators in the adoption of
SOX, insisted that "[w]e need to establish this oversight board.., to
provide an extra guarantee of its independence .... ."51 Congress
structured the PCAOB to evade the "extraordinary amount of political
pressure [that] was [previously] brought to bear on the [SEC]" when it
attempted to limit accounting firms' capabilities of performing both
audit and consulting services. 52
Congress's intent to insulate the PCAOB from political
pressure is evident from the chosen form of the entity as a nonprofit
corporation with substantial regulatory authority, whose members are
appointed by and removable by members of an independent agency
only "for good cause."5 3 The "massive, unchecked powers" of the
PCAOB, accompanied with the lack of SEC oversight and the double
for-cause removal structure prompted the Free Enterprise Fund to
47. Id. §§ 7217(d)(1)-(2).
48. Id. §§ 7214(c)-(h).
49. Id. §§ 7217(c)(1), (3).
50. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm) ("This Board is going
to have massive power, unchecked power, by design.").
51. Id. (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
52. Michael A. Carvin, Noel J. Francisco & Christian G. Vergonis, Practitioner Note,
Massive, Unchecked Power by Design: The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 199, 203-04 (2007) (quoting
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection: Hearings on the Legislative History of the Sabanes-
Oxley Act of 2002: Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other
Public Companies Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 15
(2002) (statement of Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the SEC)).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (c), (e).
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challenge the PCAOB's constitutionality under the Appointments
Clause and the principle of separation of powers.5 4
B. The Power of Appointment
One of the primary challenges to the PCAOB's structure is that
it violates the Appointments Clause because its members are principal
officers who must be appointed by the President, as opposed to the
commissioners of the SEC. This Section sets forth the text of the
Appointments Clause and the Framers' interpretation of the
President's appointment power. This Section also discusses selected
case law on the distinction between principal and inferior officers,
which in turn determines to whom Congress may grant the power of
appointment of such officers.
1. The Appointments Clause and the Framers' Understanding
Under Article II of the Constitution, the Framers explicitly
delegated the primary power of appointment of federal officers to the
President.5 5 Article II, § 2, cl. 2, commonly referred to as the
"Appointments Clause," states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 6
Debates over the Appointments Clause at the Constitutional
Convention focused on maintaining accountability for appointments
and providing a check on concentrated power. 57 To promote
government accountability, the Framers deemed the President to be
the "security fit for appointments" and structured the power of
appointment to prevent Congressional encroachment on the executive
branch.58 The Supreme Court has described the structure of the
54. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
56. Id.
57. Note, Congressional Restrictions on the President's Appointment Power and the Role of
Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1917 (2007)
[hereinafter Congressional Restrictions].
58. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997); Congressional Restrictions, supra
note 57, at 1918; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 128-31 (1976) (explaining that the
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Appointments Clause as "among the significant structural safeguards
of the constitutional scheme."59
Although the Framers granted the President the sole power to
nominate principal officers, the Constitution also contemplates an
active role for the legislative branch. The Appointments Clause
requires the appointment of principal officers be made only with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 60 The Clause also authorizes
Congress to vest the appointment of certain officers in persons other
than the President.61 Alexander Hamilton observed that the joint
participation of the President and the Senate would further promote
public accountability, explaining: "The blame of a bad nomination
would fall upon the president singly and absolutely. The censure of
rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate."62
2. The Distinction between Principal and Inferior Officers
under the Appointments Clause
As confirmed by the Supreme Court, the Appointments Clause
establishes three categories of federal officials: principal officers,
inferior officers, and employees. 63 Employees are federal officials who
are not considered to be "officers" of the United States because they do
not exercise "significant authority" pursuant to the laws of the United
States.64 Because the Constitution only contemplates the appointment
of "Officer[s] of the United States," a federal official who fits within
the employee category need not be appointed in a manner prescribed
by the Appointments Clause.65 As described in the preceding Section,
principal officers may be appointed only by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 66 This prescribed manner of
appointment for principal officers is also the default manner for the
appointment of inferior officers. 67 However, the plain text of the
debates of the Constitutional Convention are "replete with expressions of fear that the
Legislative Branch ... will aggrandize itself at the expense of the other two branches").
59. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659.
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
61. Id.
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Beloff ed. 1987).
63. Congressional Restrictions, supra note 57, at 1916 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26 &
n.162 ).
64. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162 (explaining that not
all employees of the United States are Article II "officers").
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
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Appointments Clause grants Congress the option of vesting the
appointment of inferior officers in persons other than the President,
including the "Courts of Law" or "Heads of Departments." 68 This
provision of the Constitution, commonly referred to as the "Excepting
Clause," was established primarily for administrative convenience, as
the Framers could foresee that the proscribed manner of appointment
would become inconvenient when offices became numerous. 69
Unlike the President's removal power, few Supreme Court
cases provide guidance on the distinction between principal and
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause.70 The dearth of cases
addressing this distinction is likely explained by the text of the
Appointments Clause and the history of the appointment of federal
officers. 71 Congress has often placed the power of appointment of
federal officers in the President, which is clearly allowed under the
text of the Appointments Clause, regardless of whether the officer is
principal or inferior. Moreover, when Congress historically has
provided for the appointment of an officer by the head of a
department, it has been fairly clear that the officer was inferior since
the head of the department could remove the inferior officer at will. 72
Although Supreme Court precedent on the Appointments
Clause is not as extensive as its jurisprudence on other executive
powers, the Court has provided some guidance for determining
whether a federal official is a principal or inferior officer. In Morrison
v. Olson, the Supreme Court held that the provision of the Ethics in
Government Act vesting the appointment of independent counsel in
the Special Division of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
did not violate the Appointments Clause. 73 The Court did not attempt
to establish a clear test on the distinction between principal and
inferior officers because, in its view, the independent counsel "clearly
falls on the 'inferior officer' side of that line."74 The Court did,
68. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660.
69. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879).
70. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 705 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("Two hundred years after the adoption of the United States Constitution the federal courts are,
essentially for the first time, required to construe closely the appointments clause of Article II.").
The Note discusses the President's removal power infra Part II(c)(2).
71. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 705 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
72. Id.
73. 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (finding for the government both on the "principal versus
inferior officer" question and on Congress's limited power to provide for "interbranch
appointments").
74. Id. at 671.
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however, provide several factors leading to its conclusion that the
independent counsel is an inferior officer within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause. 75 First, the fact that the attorney general could
remove the independent counsel indicated at least some degree of
inferiority in rank, even though the officer possessed some
independent discretion to exercise her delegated powers.7 6 Second, the
Act empowered the officer to perform only "certain, limited duties,"
and the officer specifically did not possess authority to formulate
policy for the executive branch.7 7 Third, the independent counsel's
authority was limited in jurisdiction, and its office was "temporary in
the sense that an independent counsel is appointed essentially to
accomplish a single task."7 8
Building on Morrison, the Supreme Court most recently
analyzed the distinction between principal and inferior officers in
Edmond v. United States.79 The Court concluded that the judges of the
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior officers and,
therefore, their appointments by the Secretary of Transportation were
constitutional.8 0 In reaching its conclusion, the Court insisted that its
prior Appointment Clause jurisprudence, including Morrison, had not
set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal
and inferior officers.81 The Court went on to delineate a more
authoritative test, stating, "[T]he term 'inferior officer' connotes a
relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers below the
President."8 2 It further defined "inferior officers" as "officers whose
work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were
appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and consent of
the Senate."8 3 The "directed and supervised" test continues to provide
a basis for determining officer status under the Appointments Clause.
Several methods of oversight weighed in favor of the Edmond
judges' classification as inferior officers. The Judge Advocate General
75. Id. at 671-73. The Court also indicated that the Framers provided little guidance to
distinguish between principal and inferior officers and that the line distinguishing them "is one
that is far from clear." Id. at 671.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 671-72 ("An independent counsel's role is restricted primarily to investigation
and, if appropriate, prosecution for certain federal crimes.").
78. Id. at 672.
79. 520 U.S. 651, 658-66 (1997).
80. Id. at 666.
81. Id. at 661; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) ("We need not attempt
here to decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers ....
82. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.
83. Id. at 663.
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and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces supervised the
work of the Coast Guard judges.8 4 The Judge Advocate General
maintained the power to remove a Coast Guard judge from his judicial
assignment without cause.8 5 Notwithstanding several limitations on
the Judge Advocate General and Court of Appeals' control over the
judges' work, the Court emphasized that the judges "have no power to
render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted
to do so by other executive officers. '8 6
C. Separation of Powers and the President's Removal Power
Another strong challenge to the PCAOB structure is that the
double for-cause limitation on removal violates separation of powers
principles because it burdens the President's ability to faithfully
execute the laws. This Section discusses the principle of separation of
powers and the emphasis the Framers placed on it as a constitutional
safeguard. It also sets forth case law discussing the principle in the
context of congressional limitations on the President's removal
authority.
1. The Framers' Emphasis on the Principle of Separation of Powers
and the Unitary Executive
Although not expressly provided for in the Constitution, the
Framers implicitly included the principle of separation of powers in
the first three articles of the Constitution.87 The Supreme Court has
recognized that "[t]he principle of separation of powers was not simply
an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven
into the document that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787."88 The Framers took great care to ensure that the governmental
powers were separated into three branches, and that checks and
84. Id. at 664.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 664-65. The Court notes several limitations on the supervision of the judges,
including a prohibition on the Judge Advocate General's attempt to influence the outcome of
individual proceedings and a narrower scope of review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces than that exercised by the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.
87. See e.g., Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 591 (1949)
(citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.")).
88. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976).
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balances existed among the three branches.8 9 The Framers relied on
Montesquieu's well-known maxim that a government should largely
separate the executive, legislative, and judicial powers from one
another. 90 James Madison elaborated on the significance of this
structure: "[I]f there is a principle in our constitution, indeed in any
free constitution, more sacred than another, it is that which separates
the legislative, executive and judicial powers."91
Article II of the Constitution is clear in prescribing that "[tihe
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America."92 The Framers also granted the President the sole authority
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 93 From these
clauses and the debates during the Constitutional Convention, the
Framers' intent to create a strong, unitary executive, who is
accountable to the public, is well-documented. 94 Although the
President must execute the laws with the aid of subordinates, the
Framers chose to vest the executive authority in a single person "in
order to focus, rather than to spread, Executive responsibility thereby
facilitating accountability." 95
2. The President's Removal Power and Congressional Limitations
While the Appointment Clause in Article II expressly provides
the procedure for the appointment of federal officers, the Constitution
does not include any express provisions regarding the removal of
officers, except for the removal from office by impeachment. 96 The
Supreme Court, however, has concluded that the President's plenary
executive power includes "the general administrative control of those
executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal
of executive officers-a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed." 97 Although the Supreme
Court upheld congressional limitations on the President's removal
89. Free Enter. Fund, v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 688 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).
90. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 120-21 (discussing the Framers' intent for separation of
powers).
91. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 604 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
93. Id. art. II, § 3.
94. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116-17 (1926).
95. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
96. Myers, 272 U.S. at 109-10. The provision regarding removal of officers by impeachment
is located in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
97. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 136 (1976) (quoting Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64).
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power in certain situations,98 the power to retain some degree of
removal over federal officers who do not remain faithful to the
President's direction is necessary to the President's execution of the
laws.99
In a highly detailed opinion by then-Chief Justice and former
President Taft, the Supreme Court in Myers v. United States
addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring Senate approval
of the President's decision to remove a federal officer. 100 Finding the
statute unconstitutional, the Court insisted that the President's
removal power is "essential to the execution of the laws" such that
"[t]he moment that he loses confidence in the intelligence, ability,
judgment, or loyalty of any [subordinate], he must have the power to
remove him without delay."10 1 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
relied on the Framers' original understanding of the President's
removal power, and also on the fact that the executive power was
given in general terms, whereas Congress's powers were specifically
enumerated. 10 2 The Court endorsed a broad presidential removal
power, finding "[t]he power of removal [to be] incident to the power of
appointment, not to the power of advising and consenting to
appointment."1 03
This broad endorsement to the President's removal power
continues to have validity today with respect to its prohibition against
any direct congressional involvement in the removal of executive
officers. 10 4 For example, the Court invalidated a statute in Bowsher v.
Synar that allowed Congress to remove the comptroller general.'0 5
This structure violated the principle of separation of powers by
reserving a right for Congress to execute the laws through its removal
authority.10 6 Although Myers and Bowsher called for heavy suspicion
of congressional limitations on removal, the Supreme Court's
98. See infra text accompanying notes 107-19 (discussing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988) and Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)).
99. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117, 123-25.
100. Id. at 107. The statute provided, "Postmasters of the first, second and third classes shall
be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate ...." Id. (quoting 19 Stat. 80, 81, c. 179 (1876)).
101. Id. at 117, 134.
102. Id. at 115-23.
103. Id. at 122.
104. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). The continuing validity of this holding was
recognized by the dissenting judge in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
105. 478 U.S. at 732-34.
106. Id.
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interpretation of the removal power must be read in light of its
subsequent decisions in Humphrey's Executor v. United States1 7 and
Morrison v. Olson. 08
In Humphrey's Executor, the Supreme Court narrowed its
expansive interpretation of the President's removal power. Here, the
Court faced a constitutional challenge to the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which limited the President's power of removal over
the principal officers to "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office."'10 9 The Court concluded that requiring the members of the
Federal Trade Commission to be removable at will by the President
would frustrate Congress's intent that the Commission be "free from
'political domination or control.' "110 The Court found it "plain" that the
President does not possess "illimitable power of removal" and that
Congress retains the authority, in certain circumstances, to limit the
removal of principal officers except for cause."' Rather than
overruling Myers, however, the Court narrowed its holding to the
removal of "purely executive officers." 112 According to Humphrey's
Executor, the constitutionality of congressional limitations on the
President's removal power "depend[s] upon the character of the
office." 1 3 Further, the Court expressly left the question of the
constitutionality of other removal limitations for future
consideration. "14
Expanding on its decision in Humphrey's Executor, the Court in
Morrison v. Olson upheld a "good cause" restriction on the removal of
an inferior officer by the head of a department who was removable by
the President at will.1 ' 5 Rather than the "character of the office"
inquiry set forth in Humphrey's Executor, however, the Court
107. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
108. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
109. 295 U.S. at 623.
110. Id. at 625 (quoting the "prevailing view" of both houses of Congress that the
Commission "be 'separate and apart from any existing department of the government - not
subject to the orders of the President' ").
111. Id. at 629.
112. Id. at 631-32.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 632 ('"To the extent that, between the decision in the Myers Case, which sustains
the unrestrictable power of the President to remove purely executive officers, and our present
decision that such power does not extend to an office such as that here involved, there shall
remain a field of doubt ... ").
115. 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (Supp. V 1982) (authorizing
removal "other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney
General and only for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition
that substantially impairs the performance of [the officer's] duties")).
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reasoned that "the real question is whether the removal restrictions
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to
perform his constitutional duty." 116 The Court first concluded that the
imposition of a "good cause" standard of removal over an inferior
officer alone did not impermissibly burden the President's power to
control the officer in the execution of his duties. 117 The statute did not
"completely strip" the President's removal power because the
President, through the attorney general, retained sufficient authority
to ensure that the inferior officer competently performed his duties in
accordance with the enabling statute. 118 Lastly, the Court concluded
that the statute as a whole did not prevent the President from
accomplishing his constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the
laws. 119 Thus, as these cases demonstrate, the Court has upheld
congressional limitations on the President's removal power under
certain circumstances.
III. SAME LAW, DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS: DEBATING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PCAOB
Based on the significant authority granted to the PCAOB and
the lack of SEC oversight, the Free Enterprise Fund recently
challenged the constitutionality of the PCAOB under the
Appointments Clause and the principle of separation of powers. 120 The
Free Enterprise Fund was joined in the suit by one of its members, the
Nevada accounting firm of Beckstead & Watts, which has been the
subject of ongoing formal investigation by the PCAOB since 2004.121
The parties sought an order enjoining any further action against
Beckstead & Watts and a judgment declaring SOX's provisions
governing the appointment and removal of PCAOB members
116. Id. at 691.
117. Id. at 691-92.
118. Id. at 692.
119. Id. at 692-96; see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) ("[In
determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the
proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.").
120. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 1. The plaintiffs also claimed that SOX violated
the non-delegation doctrine; however, this claim was omitted on appeal. Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 670 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 2378 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861).
121. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No.06-0217, 2007 WL 891675,
at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007), aff'd, 537 F.3d 667, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378.
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unconstitutional. 122 The United States acted as intervenor to defend
the constitutionality of the PCAOB,' 23 and several briefs as amici
curiae were submitted in support of both parties. 124
Siding with the PCAOB, the federal district court held both
that the PCAOB members were inferior officers and that its removal
restrictions did not violate the principle of separation of powers. 125
Interpreting the PCAOB's appointment and removal structures to be
within the bounds of Supreme Court precedent, the court found the
plaintiffs' arguments "colorable but ultimately unsuccessful."126 On
appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, two of the three judges on
the panel voted to affirm the District Court's judgment and uphold the
constitutionality of the PCAOB.127 Judge Kavanaugh, however,
strongly dissented, urging that the PCAOB's structure violated both
the Appointments Clause and the principle of separation of powers. 128
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will decide whose argument is
stronger when it hears the Free Enterprise Fund's challenge during
the October 2009 Term.
A. The Challengers' View: The PCAOB's Structure
Violates the Constitution
1. Violation of the Appointments Clause
A primary issue regarding the PCAOB's constitutionality is
whether its appointment structure violates the Appointments Clause,
which turns on whether its members are principal officers who must
be appointed by the President. 129 The Free Enterprise Fund,
Beckstead & Watts, Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. Circuit, and other
commentators (collectively "the Challengers") argue that Edmond v.
United States1 30 provided a definitive test for determining officer
status, and that the members of the PCAOB are principal officers
122. Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *1-2.
123. Brief for the United States at 3, Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d 667 (No. 07-5127).
124. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP Urging Reversal at 2, Free
Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d 667 (No. 07-5127) (urging reversal with a primary focus on the removal
issue) [hereinafter Washington Legal Foundation Brief].
125. Free Enter. Fund, 2007 WL 891675, at *5-6.
126. Id. at *3.
127. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685.
128. Id. at 686-87, 715 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
129. Brief ofAppellants, supra note 41, at 31.
130. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
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pursuant to this test.131 Edmond states that inferior officers are
"officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate.'1 32 From this language, Judge Kavanaugh
derived a "directed and supervised" test to determine officer status.133
The Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead & Watts advocate
that the "effective discipline through the power of removal" is a
necessary component of the directed and supervised test. 3 4 Judge
Kavanaugh reasons that, because Edmond and other relevant
precedent have recognized the power of removal as a "powerful tool for
control," the most important factor in determining an officer's status is
whether the officer is removable at will.135 The Challengers also argue
that Morrison13 6 is distinguishable because the officer had limited
jurisdiction, and because the office was temporary. 137 In contrast, SOX
grants the members of the PCAOB extensive authority over the public
accounting profession and the Board continues in existence until
dissolved by an act of Congress. 38
In addition to the removal component of the analysis, the
authority of a superior officer to guide the inferior officer's actions
"through ongoing, day-to-day supervision" from the outset comprises
another essential part of the test.139 Indeed, Judge Kavanaugh finds
the authority of a superior other than the President to "affirmatively
command" the ongoing conduct of an officer as the only saving grace to
inferior officer status, other than the power to remove the officer at
will. 40 He purports that officers not removable at will ordinarily are
inferior officers only if:
131. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Brief of Appellants,
supra note 41, at 31.
132. 520 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added).
133. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 706 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).
134. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 31. Although one could make an inference from
their brief that Appellants would require an officer to be removable at will in order for the officer
to be inferior, this premise is not explicitly stated in Appellants' brief. Id.
135. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 707 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) ("Once an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that can
remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear and, in the
performance of his functions, obey." (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401
(D.C. Cir. 1986))).
136. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
137. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 708 n.17 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(a), (c), (0 (2006).
139. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 32.
140. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 709 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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(1) the statute expressly provides that the officer can be removed for failing to follow a
supervisor's direction and supervision, or (2) the statute expressly provides that a
superior officer other than the President has authority to prevent and affirmatively
command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of, all of the officer's exercises of
executive authority against the public. 141
Applying this test to the PCAOB, the Challengers first observe
that the for-cause restriction on removal of the members of the
PCAOB poses a significant obstacle to finding the members to be
inferior officers. 142 The Challengers argue that the primary reason for
for-cause removal is to place PCAOB members outside the significant
direction and supervision of their superiors. 143 They also contend that
SOX does not provide the SEC or any other superior with any
meaningful means to supervise or direct the conduct of the PCAOB
members. 144 Here, the Challengers advocate that the SEC does not
have the authority to affirmatively command or manage the PCAOB's
conduct with respect to investigations, inspections, and enforcement
actions. 45 Additionally, the PCAOB's prosecutorial authority is not
subject to SEC review, and its imposition of sanctions is only subject
to after-the-fact review.146 Furthermore, the SEC's method of review of
PCAOB rules through "cumbersome notice-and-comment procedures"
is insufficient to constitute direction and supervision under
Edmond.147
2. Violation of the Principle of Separation of Powers
The Challengers contend that the double for-cause limitation
on removal of the PCAOB violates the principle of separation of
powers by excessively attenuating the President's ability to control the
execution of the laws. 48 The Challengers recognize that neither the
Supreme Court nor any inferior court has addressed a structure in
which an officer is removable only for cause by the head of a
department, who in turn is removable only for cause by the
President.1 49 The Challengers primarily derive their separation of
powers argument from Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Carvin et al., supra note 52, at 231-32.
145. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 709 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
146. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 33.
147. Id. at 34.
148. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 12-13.
149. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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President's removal power and the lack of a similar structure among
any other agency. 150 An amicus curiae brief written in support of the
Free Enterprise Fund also urges unconstitutionality based on the
executive branch's long-standing interpretation of the President's
broad removal powers. 151 Moreover, the brief cites the harmful effects
of SOX, including the sharp increase in accounting and auditing
expenses, as added dangers to a judicial endorsement of the
PCAOB.152
The underlying test to determine the constitutionality of a
congressionally imposed limitation to the President's removal power
requires an inquiry into whether the removal restriction
"impermissibly burdens the President's power to control or supervise
[an officer] in the execution of his or her duties.'' 53 The Challengers
contend that the "seminal case" in determining the constitutionality of
removal restrictions is Myers, in which the Court emphasized that a
President's removal power over those officers "for whom he cannot
continue to be responsible" is critical to the President's faithful
execution of the laws. 5 4
While the Challengers identify Myers as the most influential
case in the Supreme Court's removal restriction jurisprudence, all
parties recognize that any case within this area must be considered in
light of Humphrey's Executor and Morrison.155 In the Challengers'
view, Humphrey's Executor and Morrison may, however, be limited to
their respective holdings, neither of which expressly authorizes the
double for-cause removal structure nor even acknowledges the
possibility of such a structure. 156 Although Humphrey's Executor
blessed the creation of independent agencies, the Court did not stretch
its holding beyond permitting a for-cause removal restriction on
concededly principal officers. 157 Morrison-perhaps the most pivotal
case to the PCAOB-may be limited to circumstances in which the
head of the department over the inferior officer is removable at will by
the President. 58 The Challengers describe heads of departments that
150. Id. at 698-700.
151. Washington Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 124, at 3-5.
152. Id.
153. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 14 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692
(1988)).
154. Carvin et al., supra note 52, at 217-18 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
117 (1926)).
155. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 694-96 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 696-97.
157. 295 U.S. 602, 628-29 (1935).
158. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 696 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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are removable at will as an "alter ego" of the President.159 Because the
President may remove the department head at any time for any
reason, this removal structure effectively forces the officer to obey the
President's authority.160 Because the head of the department in
Morrison was an alter ego of the President, the Morrison case was not
one in which the President's removal power was "completely
stripped."16 1
Applying these precedents to the PCAOB, the Challengers
conclude that the removal restrictions on the PCAOB are
unconstitutional for several reasons. As distinct from the statutes in
Humphrey's Executor and Morrison, SOX "completely strips" the
President's removal authority over the PCAOB because the President
can remove neither the commissioners of the SEC nor the PCAOB
members at will. 16 2 This conclusion rests on the premise that Morrison
and Humphrey's Executor represent the outermost limits of
permissible restrictions on the President's removal power.163 Judge
Kavanaugh acknowledged that the lack of any historical precedent for
this removal structure provides evidence of the PCAOB's
unconstitutionality. 164
The Challengers also conclude that the removal restrictions,
coupled with the President's lack of appointment power over the
PCAOB, violate the principle of separation of powers when viewing
together all of SOX's provisions governing the PCAOB. 165 The lack of a
role for the President in PCAOB's appointment and the double for-
cause removal restriction unduly interfere with the President's duty to
execute the laws. 166 In this regard, "the whole of this statute is worse
than the sum of the parts" because it provides the President with very
little means to influence how the PCAOB effectuates its policies. 167
159. Carvin et al., supra note 52, at 218-20.
160. Id.
161. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 16-17 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
692 (1988)).
162. Id. at 17.
163. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 698 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 699.
165. Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 16-17.
166.Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 712-13 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 713; Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at 16-17.
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B. The Supporters' View: The PCAOB's Structure is Constitutional
1. SEC Commissioners May Appoint the PCAOB
Those who view SOX's provisions governing the PCAOB as
constitutional-including the United States as intervenor, the U.S.
District Court of the District of Columbia, Circuit Judges Rogers and
Brown, and other commentators (collectively "the Supporters")-
defend the congressional grant of appointment of PCAOB members to
the commissioners of the SEC. 168 The Supporters rely on much of the
same Supreme Court precedent on which the Challengers base their
conclusions; however, they arrive at different conclusions. 169 According
to the Supporters, the Court provided the basis for determining officer
status in Edmond when it stated, "Generally speaking, the term
'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with some higher ranking
officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an 'inferior'
officer depends on whether he has a superior."'170
The Supporters first argue that the Challengers' emphasis on
the necessity of "ongoing, day-to-day supervision" to demonstrate that
an official is an inferior officer conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent. 171 The Supreme Court has routinely insisted that the
presence of significant authority to execute the laws marks the line
between officers and non-officers as opposed to principal versus
inferior officers. 172 Edmond and other cases illustrate that an officer
may be inferior for the purposes of the Appointments Clause even
when the officer's superior does not possess plenary authority over the
day-to-day operations of the officer. 73
Furthermore, the Supporters also argue that the Challengers
over-rely on the removal authority with respect to its relevance in
determining officer status.174 While acknowledging the removal
structure to be one factor in the determination of officer status, the
Supporters unreservedly disagree that the ability of a superior to
remove an officer at will is paramount to finding the officer to be
168. E.g., Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 676.
169. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, supra note 123, at 25-26 (relying on Edmond v.
United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997)).
170. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662).
171. Brief for Appellees, supra note 4, at 26 (quoting Brief of Appellants, supra note 41, at
32).
172. Id.
173. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672; Brief for the United States, supra note 123, at 25.
174. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 673-74.
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"inferior."'176 The Supporters rely on Morrison v. Olson as an indication
that the superior officer's ability to remove the officer for cause is a
factor in favor of the officer's inferior status.176 They also cite cases in
which the Supreme Court has authorized congressionally imposed
restrictions on the removal power of principal officers. 177
Several provisions of SOX support the position that the SEC
maintains sufficient direction and supervision over the PCAOB. In
this regard, the SEC has the power to review-and then modify-
inspection reports and sanctions imposed by the PCAOB.178 The SEC
must approve rules promulgated by the PCAOB and may abrogate,
delete, or add to them. 79 The Supporters also argue that the SEC's
removal power over the PCAOB members, and the potential for the
SEC to interpret this power broadly, indicates the PCAOB members'
inferior officer status. 80 According to this reasoning, SOX may even
provide the SEC with more oversight than was present in Edmond
and Morrison because the SEC's review of PCAOB action is de novo,
and because the SEC may limit the PCAOB's jurisdiction by
rescinding its authority.' 8 ' In sum, because the SEC maintains
"comprehensive supervisory power" over the PCAOB, the Supporters
conclude that the PCAOB members are inferior officers, and,
therefore, SOX does not violate the Appointments Clause by vesting
the power of appointment with the commissioners of the SEC. 8 2
2. A Permissible Limitation on Removal
The Supporters base their separation of powers defense on
Supreme Court precedent regarding the President's removal power
175. Id.
176. Id.; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (upholding for-cause removal
restrictions on inferior officers).
177. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 673-74; see also United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483,
485 (1886) ('CThe constitutional authority in congress to thus vest the appointment implies
authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as congress may enact in
relation to the officers so appointed.").
178. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214(c)-(h).
179. Id. §§ 7217(b)(2), (5).
180. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 674-75 (finding persuasive the district court's reasoning
that the SEC may interpret its removal authority to include the authority to remove for
negligent behavior so that the removal restrictions are not unduly severe in all circumstances).
181. Brief for Appellees, supra note 4, at 22-23 (relying on 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(c)(5), 7217(c)(2)
(2006)).
182. Id. at 19; see also Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 672 ("[The Commissioners] exercise
comprehensive control over Board procedures and decisions and Board members.").
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and Congress's authority to create independent agencies. 183
Recognizing the double for-cause limitation as an untested removal
structure, the Supporters nonetheless conclude that "It]he bulk of the
Fund's challenge to [SOX] was fought-and lost-over seventy years
ago when the Supreme Court decided Humphrey's Executor."'84 They
reason that the arguments against the double for-cause limitation are
more of an "attack on independent agencies generally" than a
challenge to the PCAOB's specific removal structure. 185
According to the Supporters, the Supreme Court's holding that
independent agencies are constitutional demonstrates that removal
restrictions on the PCAOB do not impermissibly interfere with the
President's ability to carry out his constitutional duties. 186 Humphrey's
Executor and its progeny, upholding for-cause restrictions on the
removal of principal officers, certainly point in favor of the PCAOB's
constitutionality.187 Here, the Supporters argue that the Supreme
Court, through its approval of independent agencies, blessed
Congress's authority to create federal officers who are "nonpartisan"
and "independent of executive authority."'88
Those supporting the constitutionality of SOX's double for-
cause removal limitation rely on Morrison v. Olson 89 and other
precedent upholding removal restrictions on inferior officers. The
underlying theme of this argument is that the power of removal is
"incident to the power of appointment."'' 90 Because the text of the
Appointments Clause clearly states that Congress may vest the power
of appointment of inferior officers with the heads of departments, the
logical corollary is that Congress may vest the removal power of these
inferior officers with the heads of departments as incident to their
appointment authority.'19 The Supporters view Morrison as upholding
the constitutionality of the removal restrictions on the inferior officer
183. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685.
184. Id. at 679, 685.
185. Brief for Appellees, supra note 4, at 46 (insisting that the very purpose of independent
agencies is to place limitations on the President's control over agency decisions and that
agencies' personnel decisions should not require greater Presidential control than other agency
decisions).
186. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 679, 685.
187. 295 U.S. 602, 623 (1935).
188. Id. at 624-25.
189. 487 U.S. 654, 677 (1988) (upholding power of judiciary's Special Division's to appoint
independent counsel).
190. Brief for Appellees, supra note 4, at 40 (quoting In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259
(1839)).
191. Brief for the United States, supra note 123, at 47.
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not because Congress vested the removal power in the President's
"alter ego," but rather because the Court disagreed with the
contention that a for-cause restriction "unduly trammels on executive
authority."192
Furthermore, the Supporters reason that the double for-cause
removal restriction does not "completely strip[" the President of his
removal power over the PCAOB. 193 Because the President possesses
the power to nominate the commissioners of the SEC and remove
them for cause, the President retains some degree of influence over
the PCAOB through the removal power.194 Thus, the President
maintains "indirect removal authority" such that the President may
remove the SEC commissioners if a PCAOB member engaged in
sufficiently serious misconduct and the commissioners refused to
exercise their removal authority.1 95
Equally important to the constitutional status of the PCAOB is
a determination of whether SOX's provisions governing the PCAOB
collectively limit the President's ability to execute the laws.1 96 The
Supporters argue that, in dealing with removal limitations, the Court
has emphasized not a formal but rather a functional approach
designed to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the
President's constitutional duty.197 In the present case, although
Congress intended some degree of independence for the PCAOB, the
"vast degree of Commission control at every significant step" allows
for ample accountability to the President and outweighs any
constitutional concern created by the removal restrictions. 98 The
Supporters also urge that this is not a case in which Congress is
attempting to aggrandize its own powers at the expense of the
192. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 679 (D.C. Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861) (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S.
at 691).
193. Id. at 682-83.
194. Id. at 682.
195. Brief for Appellees, supra note 4, at 44.
196. Brief for the United States, supra note 123, at 49 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691).
197. Id. The Supreme Court has stated,
The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President's
exercise of the "executive power" and his constitutionally appointed duty to
"take care that the laws be faithfully executed" under Article II.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689-90.
198. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 683.
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executive branch, as Congress does not retain control over PCAOB
actions. 199
IV. A RECONCILIATION: WHY THE PCAOB WITHSTANDS SCRUTINY
UNDER THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE BUT NOT SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Free Enterprise Fund case, which will be heard by the
Supreme Court during the October 2009 Term, provides an
opportunity for the Court both to resolve the constitutional challenges
to the PCAOB and to clarify further and expand on its Appointments
Clause and separation of powers jurisprudence. This Part explains
why the most consistent application of Supreme Court precedent
requires a conclusion that the PCAOB's structure does not violate the
Appointments Clause but does violate the principle of separation of
powers. Because the SEC maintains a "veto" power over the PCAOB's
most significant powers, the PCAOB members are inferior officers who
may be appointed by the commissioners of the SEC. But, although the
PCAOB's appointment restrictions are constitutional, the double for-
cause limitation on removal should not withstand scrutiny under a
separation of powers analysis. This novel removal structure both
excessively attenuates the President's ability to see that the laws are
faithfully executed and indirectly draws power over the execution of
the laws to Congress. Furthermore, to the extent that any uncertainty
remains regarding the constitutionality of the PCAOB, the Supreme
Court should proceed cautiously before validating an unprecedented
congressional limitation on the President's removal authority.
A. Constitutional Safeguards and Investor Uncertainty: Why These
Issues Must Be Resolved
Although the Court has granted certiorari in Free Enterprise
Fund, the case faces preliminary obstacles to the resolution of its
constitutional issues. 200 A Court disinterested in dealing further with
199. Brief for the United States, supra note 124, at 45; cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
730-31 (1986) (holding that Congress retaining removal authority over Comptroller General
violates separation of powers by giving Congress a form of control over the execution of the
laws).
200. Peter L. Strauss, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
61 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 58 (2009) (noting that the Court may avoid the constitutional
issues by concluding that the petitioners have not exhausted their administrative remedies, that
there has been no final agency action requisite for judicial review, or that the constitutional
questions are not yet ripe for judicial resolution).
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the thorny constitutional challenges under the Appointments Clause
and the principle of separation of powers might opt to avoid ruling on
these important issues by employing the canon of constitutional
avoidance. 201 As such, the Court might avoid weighing in on the
constitutional issues by taking a close look at the PCAOB's
jurisdictional argument and conclude that the Free Enterprise Fund
failed to exhaust SOX's statutory review procedures. 20 2
Both the federal district court and the D.C. Circuit found in
favor of the Free Enterprise Fund on the jurisdictional issue,20 3 and in
all likelihood, the Supreme Court will agree with its judicial
colleagues that the constitutional challenges are "collateral" to SOX's
administrative review procedures. However, no matter how
compelling the preliminary obstacles may be, the fundamental
constitutional principles at issue and the need for clarity regarding
the constitutionality of a significant regulatory agency provide
compelling reasons for why the Court should resolve the constitutional
issues surrounding the PCAOB when it decides the case. Judge
Kavanaugh captured the magnitude of the case aptly when he stated
that the dispute regarding the PCAOB "is the most important
separation-of-powers case regarding the President's appointment and
removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years."204 This case
directly bears on the balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches and the concern of government accountability on
which the Framers of the Constitution placed high emphasis.20 5 Free
Enterprise Fund therefore presents the perfect opportunity for the
Court to clarify and expand on its prior jurisprudence regarding the
Appointments Clause and the principle of separation of powers.
In addition to the constitutional principles at stake in Free
Enterprise Fund, the case also raises concerns about a key regulatory
body that possesses authority over a significant segment of the
financial sector. In response to the accounting oversight failures that
led to financial reporting frauds at several prominent companies,
201. See Escambia County v. Macmillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) ("It is a well-established
principle . . . that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some
other ground upon which to dispose of the case.").
202. The D.C. Circuit held in favor of the Free Enterprise Fund on the jurisdictional issue
finding the constitutional challenges to be "collateral" to SOX's administrative review
procedures. Free Enter.Fund, 537 F.3d at 671.
203. Id.
204. Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 685 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
205. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The purpose of the
separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular,
was not merely to assure effective government but to preserve individual freedom.").
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Congress charged the PCAOB with the task of protecting investors
through the oversight of corporate accounting standards.2 6 While it is
debatable whether the PCAOB has succeeded in reviving investor
confidence, it is likely that the uncertainties surrounding the
constitutionality of the PCAOB will cast a negative light on the
public's perception that this regulatory body will succeed in
accomplishing its congressional mandate. If the Supreme Court were
to affirm the constitutionality of the PCAOB, this holding would work
to bolster public confidence in this regulatory body. If the Supreme
Court invalidated SOX's creation of the PCAOB, it would alert
Congress of any constitutional misstep with the PCAOB and provide
an opportunity for Congress to address the problem. In either
circumstance, a Supreme Court resolution will clarify these
constitutional uncertainties and promote the interests of investors and
the general public.
B. The Inability to Render a Final Decision is Determinative
of Inferior Officer Status
The few cases dealing with the distinction between principal
and inferior officers indicate that the Supreme Court should not
invalidate those provisions of SOX governing the appointment of
PCAOB members because these members are inferior officers who
may be appointed by the head of a department. The most pertinent
language can be found in Edmond, where the Court made three
definitive statements regarding the test for determining officer status.
As a general premise, the Court stated that "the term 'inferior officer'
connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers
below the President: whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends on
whether he has a superior."20 7 The Court also stated that inferior
officers are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some
level by superior officers. 208 Lastly, and most importantly, is the
Court's conclusion that "[w]hat is significant is that the [officers in
question] have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the
United States unless permitted to do so by other executive officers." 20 9
These three conclusions in Edmond, which govern how officer
status should be determined, indicate that the PCAOB members fall
206. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
207. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997).
208. Id. at 663.
209. Id. at 664.
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on the inferior officer side of the line. It is unquestionable that the
members of the PCAOB have some form of "relationship" with higher-
ranking officers below the President. Given the SEC commissioners'
authority to review, modify, or abrogate PCAOB duties, the SEC
commissioners must be considered, to some extent, "superiors" of the
PCAOB. Therefore, Edmond suggests that the PCAOB members at
least meet the general premise of inferior officer status.
The fact that Congress granted the SEC commissioners some
authority to direct and supervise the PCAOB's major functions is also
significant in the determination of the PCAOB members' officer
status. Although it is debatable whether the SEC commissioners
possess "comprehensive supervisory authority" over the PCAOB, as
the Supporters argue, the Supreme Court should not require this
degree of supervisory authority to find an officer to be "inferior." Those
challenging SOX's appointment provisions infer too much from
Edmond's purported "direct and supervise test." A close reading of
Edmond casts serious doubt on the Challengers' contention that the
requisite supervision and direction requires the SEC to "affirmatively
command" the PCAOB's "ongoing, day-to-day" activities. Rather, all
Edmond requires is that the SEC exercise some level of direction and
supervision over the PCAOB. 210 Like the superior officers in Edmond,
the SEC commissioners possess some form of oversight over all of the
PCAOB's most significant functions, including review over
inspections, investigations, the promulgation of rules, the imposition
of sanctions, and budget preparation.21' To the extent those
challenging the constitutionality of SOX find any support for the
requirement of a higher degree of control, this concern is alleviated by
the fact that the commissioners may dismiss the PCAOB of any of its
responsibilities under SOX.212
Although those challenging SOX may reasonably take issue
with some of the vague language expressed in Edmond, the Supreme
Court clearly gave substantial weight to the superior officers' veto
power over the officers in question.213 This significant means of control
is also present in SOX, which requires the commissioners' approval
before rules promulgated by the PCAOB go into effect and also grants
the commissioners authority to cancel or modify any sanction imposed
210. See id. at 663 (concluding that " 'inferior officers' are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the
advice and consent of the Senate").
211.15 U.S.C. §§ 7217(b)-(d) (2006).
212. Id. §§ 7217(d)(1)-(2).
213. 520 U.S. at 665.
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by the PCAOB.214 Therefore, as was critical in Edmond, the PCAOB
has "no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States
unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers." 215
Although the presence of significant regulatory authority,
which is undoubtedly possessed by the PCAOB, should play some role
in determining officer status, it should by no means be conclusive. An
officer's ability to exercise broad powers may be relevant in an effort to
demonstrate absence of direction and supervision by any other federal
officers. However, when a superior officer has a "veto power" over the
officer in question, the existence of significant authority should be
given little weight. As the Supreme Court recognized in Buckley v.
Valeo, in contrast to "employees," all federal "officers"-which
undoubtedly includes the members of the PCAOB-possess significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.21 6
Furthermore, the Challengers' contention that removal at will
by a superior officer is the most important factor in finding an officer
inferior conflicts with both Edmond and Morrison. Edmond does
indicate that the power of removal is "a powerful tool for control."21 7
However, nowhere in its opinion does the Court indicate that the
power of removal was the most important factor in its determination.
Moreover, the Court acknowledges that the power to remove, not just
the power to remove at will, is a "powerful tool."218 Morrison bolsters
this conclusion by relying on the superior officer's power to remove the
officer for good cause in reaching its conclusion that the officer in
question maintained inferior officer status.219 Therefore, the SEC
commissioners' authority to remove the PCAOB members for cause
should likewise count in favor of inferior officer status.
C. The Double For-Cause Removal Restriction Unconstitutionally
Burdens the Executive Power
Finding the PCAOB members to be inferior officers under the
Appointments Clause is far from the end of the inquiry regarding the
constitutionality of SOX's provisions governing the PCAOB. Rather,
the Supreme Court should find the PCAOB's removal structure
unconstitutional because the congressionally-imposed restrictions on
214. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7217(b)(3), (c)(3).
215. 520 U.S. at 665.
216. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
217. 520 U.S. at 664.
218. Id.
219. 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988).
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the President's removal power excessively encroach on the President's
power to execute the laws. While the double for-cause limitation on
removal is a novel structure never before addressed by the courts, the
most accurate reading of Supreme Court precedent on the principle of
separation of powers would deem SOX's removal restrictions
unconstitutional. Several unique aspects of SOX also leave the
Justices with ample room to limit their holding to the PCAOB's
statutory structure without affecting other independent agencies.
The Supporters' contention that the majority of the challenge
to SOX's removal restrictions was resolved over seventy years ago in
Humphrey's Executor fails to take into account the novelty of the
PCAOB's removal structure and the additional burden it imposes on
the President's ability to execute the laws. Rather, as suggested by
Judge Kavanaugh, the double for-cause removal restriction might
better categorize this case as "Humphrey's Executor squared. 220
Although the Court in Humphrey's Executor authorized a
congressionally imposed for-cause removal restriction on a principal
officer, the Court explicitly concluded that the constitutionality of
removal restrictions in future cases "will depend on the character of
the office." 221 The Court indicated that its holding in Humphrey's
Executor was nearing the outermost constitutional limits by expressly
leaving open the constitutionality of future cases that come within the
"field of doubt" between its Humphrey's Executor and Myers
decisions. 222
Like the Supporters, the Challengers overstate their position
that SOX's removal restrictions on the PCAOB provide a case where
the President's removal power is "completely stripped." Because the
President has the authority to appoint and remove the commissioners
of the SEC for cause, who in turn have the authority to remove the
members of the PCAOB for cause, the President still maintains some
degree of removal authority.223 However, the point at which the
President's removal power is completely stripped should not mark the
line for the constitutionality of removal restrictions. Morrison v. Olson
merely stated that granting the power of for-cause removal of an
220. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 686 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-
861).
221. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631 (1935).
222. Id. at 632.
223. An example of a case in which the President's removal power was "completely stripped"
would be if Congress granted the power of removal of an inferior officer to a principal officer who
could not be removed by the President.
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inferior to a principal officer who was removable at will by the
President did not completely strip the President of his removal
authority. 224 The Court did not indicate that completely stripping the
President of removal power was a necessary condition to invalidate
removal restrictions. 225 Rather, "the real question" was whether the
removal restrictions hinder the President's ability to fully perform his
constitutional duty to execute the laws. 226
SOX's removal restrictions on the PCAOB impede the
President's ability to faithfully execute the laws. The double for-cause
limitation excessively attenuates the President's control over these
federal officers who are charged with a significant mandate within the
executive branch. Not only does SOX place a for-cause limitation on
the removal of inferior officers, but neither the President nor an "alter
ego" has the ability to remove the PCAOB members if they enforce the
laws in a manner in which the President strongly disagrees.227
Furthermore, the for-cause restriction over the PCAOB is
particularly limiting. SOX limits the commissioners' for-cause removal
of PCAOB members to situations in which a PCAOB member
"willfully" violates his or her authority. 228 Because of the added
"willful" requirement, it may be a stretch to say that the
commissioners may remove the PCAOB members for any of the
traditional notions of for-cause removal, which generally include
"inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." 229 This
additional restriction on removal further attenuates the President's
removal authority and, consequently, his ability to faithfully execute
the laws.
Considering together the PCAOB's significant authority with
the restrictions on the appointment and removal of its members, the
PCAOB's structure is even more offensive to the principle of
separation of powers. Although not in violation of the Appointments
Clause, the congressional grant of appointment to the SEC
commissioners further hinders the President's ability to ensure that
the officers faithfully execute the laws. SEC oversight of the PCAOB
provides some degree of executive control, but the PCAOB's
substantial regulatory authority over a major financial sector
mandates an added degree of caution before allowing this
224. 487 U.S. at 691.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the President's restricted removal powers).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3).
229. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677, 681 (10th Cir. 1988).
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governmental entity to wield its authority without the requisite
accountability to the executive branch. Although a reasonable
argument exists that Congress may not be directly aggrandizing its
own powers with SOX, the principle of separation of powers works also
to prevent the encroachment of one branch on another branch's
powers. 230 The Supreme Court recently affirmed this view in Loving v.
United States when it stated, "Even when a branch does not arrogate
power to itself ... the separation of powers doctrine requires that a
branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional
duties. '231 Furthermore, there remains the viable argument that
Congress did aggrandize its powers, albeit indirectly, through its
creation of the PCAOB. Because SOX and the PCAOB owe their
existence to Congress, and Congress may abolish the statute and the
entity at any time, an avenue remains open for Congress to indirectly
influence the PCAOB, and hence maintain some influence over the
executive power. 232
Insofar as any uncertainty remains concerning the
constitutionality of SOX's provisions governing the removal of the
PCAOB, the Supreme Court should proceed cautiously before heading
down the "slippery slope" of validating an unprecedented
congressional limitation on the President's removal authority. As
discussed in Part II.C.1, the Framers considered the separation
between the three branches to be one of the foremost constitutional
safeguards to ensuring the government's accountability to the public.
The Supreme Court previously asserted: "[T]he reasonable
construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be
kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended,
and the Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than
it affirmatively requires."233 Moreover, by crafting the executive
powers in broad terms and specifically enumerating the legislative
powers, the Framers clearly intended the President's power over
removal, and the execution of the laws in general, to be interpreted
broadly. Given the strong test to government accountability at stake
in Free Enterprise Fund, the Supreme Court should be reluctant to
permit this novel structure to pass constitutional muster without close
scrutiny.
230. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128 (1872)).
231. Id.
232. See Nagy, supra note 4, at 1056-57 (explaining that Congress could declare the PCAOB
a "failed experiment" and abolish it with more ease than it could a longstanding agency).
233. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116 (1926).
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Finally, the unique structure of the PCAOB leaves the Court
plenty of room to limit its holding, and thereby ameliorates the
concern that it will invalidate other existing and future agencies
through its holding. As a practical matter, the Supporters' inability to
provide a single example of a governmental entity with a double for-
cause removal restriction is prime evidence that the PCAOB is the
only entity with this unique structure. To the extent the Court wants
to leave open the possibility that two levels of removal restrictions
may, in some cases, be constitutional, the Court could point to the
additional provisions of SOX, such as the "willful" requirement for
removal or the restrictions on appointment, to distinguish future
cases. The Court could also rely on the broad powers of the PCAOB
and the SEC's lack of "comprehensive supervisory power" over the
PCAOB to distinguish a future statutory structure that does not
hinder the President's ability to faithfully execute the laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the sequence of recent accounting frauds that
severely distressed investor confidence in public company accounting
oversight, Congress may find it necessary to create a regulatory body
with some degree of substantive independence to oversee the public
accounting profession. But, however desirable this end may be,
Congress may not achieve this result through a means that violates
fundamental constitutional principles. The Supreme Court has aptly
recognized: "The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted."23 4
Because of the uncertainty surrounding two of the President's
most essential powers and the need for clarity regarding the PCAOB's
constitutional status, the Supreme Court should weigh in on the
constitutional issues notwithstanding any viable preliminary
jurisdictional challenges to the case. A close reading of Supreme Court
precedent demonstrates that the SEC's "veto power" over the most
critical powers of the PCAOB renders its members "inferior officers,"
which allows the PCAOB to withstand scrutiny under the
Appointments Clause. This, however, is only half of the constitutional
challenge. The double for-cause limitation on removal of the PCAOB
provides a substantial obstacle to the President's ability to control
officers within the executive branch. As a result of Congress's
234. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950 (1983).
1988 [Vol. 62:6:1953
AUDITING THE PCAOB
encroachment on the President's executive authority, the novel
structure for removal of the PCAOB violates the constitutional
principle of separation of powers. The ultimate decision, however, lies
with the Supreme Court to determine whether it will invalidate the
PCAOB and vindicate the principle of separation of powers, or
whether it will uphold an unprecedented restriction on the President's
removal authority and permit Congress to aggrandize its powers at
the expense of the executive branch.
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